As personal data have been the new oil of the digital era, there is a growing trend perceiving personal data as a commodity. Although some people are willing to trade their personal data for money, they might still expect limited individual privacy loss, and the maximum tolerable privacy loss varies with each individual. In this paper, we propose a framework that enables individuals to trade their location data streams under personalized privacy loss, which can be bounded in w successive time points. However, the introduction of such personalized bounds of individual privacy loss over streaming data raises several technical challenges in the aspects of budget allocation, utility estimation of personalized differentially private mechanism, and arbitrage-free pricing. To deal with those challenges, we modularize three key modules in our framework and propose arbitrage-free trading mechanisms by combining instances of the modules. Finally, our experiments verify the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms.
INTRODUCTION
Personal data, the new oil of the digital era, are extraordinarily valuable for individuals and organizations to discover knowledge and improve products or services. However, data owners' personal data have been exploited without appropriate compensations. Many giant Internet companies, like Facebook 1 and Google 2 , provide free web services in exchange of the rights to collect, use or share their customers' personal data with no payment, but each user might deserve a monetary compensation of approximately 4 dollars by Facebook or 24 dollars by Google [4] . Worse yet, as personal data reflects the unique value and may release sensitive information of individuals, data owners may be nervous of the possibility that 1 https://www.facebook.com/legal/FB_Work_Privacy 2 https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en-US Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. SIGSPATIAL'19, November 2019, Chicago, Illinois, USA © 2019 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM ISBN 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn their privacy is not properly protected. A study shows that a compensation, especially monetary one, reduces people' expectations for privacy protection [12] , which implies that some data owners would like to provide their privacy in exchange of money. In fact, there is a growing trend towards personal data trading perceiving personal data as a commodity, which meets the demand of both data buyers and data owners. Some startup companies, such as Datacoup 3 and CitizenMe 4 , consider personal data trading platform that connects data owners (i.e., who generate the data) and data buyers (i.e., who want to utilize personal data) directly as a new business model.
Figure 1: Location Data Marketplace
Several studies [13] [17] [18] [19] [21] in the literature investigated privacy-preserving query-based data trading as shown in Figure 1 . There are three parties in the data trading: data owners, data buyers, and a market maker. Data owners contribute their personal data and get monetary compensations from the market maker in return. Data buyers request queries over the data and pay for the perturbed query answers, noisy versions of aggregate statistical results where some random noises are injected. The market maker acts as a trustworthy intermediary between data owners and data buyers, in charge of computing a perturbed query answer, calculating the query price for data buyers and compensating data owners. A major challenge in the line of works is how to determine the price of the data. A seminal work of Li et al. [19] made the connection between privacy loss and the price of data by pricing function. They proposed an important property of pricing function: arbitrage-freeness, which means the consistency of a set of priced queries. Intuitively, a buyer should not obtain the answer to a query more cheaply by deriving the answer from a less expensive set of queries.
However, there are several insufficiencies in such a marketplace when each data owner contributes their location data continuously. First, data owners should be able to bound their privacy loss given the high sensitivity of trajectories. In the traditional data marketplace shown in Figure 1 , a data buyer can purchase raw data and data owner cannot control the upper bound of their privacy loss. Our recent user survey [20] shows that most users value privacy or other criteria more important than the financial compensation when monetizing their data, which supports our argument that money cannot buy everything. Second, the existing studies [13] [19] [21] guarantee uniform privacy loss from each data owner; however, it is more natural that different data owners have quite diverse expectations on tolerable privacy loss [14] .
In this paper, we study trading infinite location data streams with bounded individual privacy loss. There are three challenges in solving the problems mentioned above. First, as individual privacy loss is bounded, the problem of budget allocation raises. Because the utility of the query answer is also bounded in that case, some queries in request of high utility may be infeasible. On the other hand, data owners may want their privacy losses within the bound to be completely sold out so that their revenue would be maximized. Consequently, the market maker needs a strategy allocating the budget of privacy loss, in order to make full use of personal data for data owners and decrease the number of infeasible query requests for data buyers.
Second, personalized privacy losses make it more difficult to design an arbitrage-free pricing function. As the query price depends on the utility of the query answer while the privacy losses determine the payments to data owners, we should find the mapping between the utility and privacy losses in order to design the pricing function. Given the list of data owners' privacy losses, it is easy to calculate the utility of the query answer perturbed by some specific perturbation mechanism. On the contrary, if the data buyer requests a query with a specific utility value, sometimes it is hard to find the corresponding privacy loss of each data owner to perturb the query answer due to the personalized bounds. Even if we succeed in finding the mapping, how to guarantee that the pricing function is arbitrage-free so that arbitrage behaviors are prevented is still a very tricky problem if such mapping is complex.
Third, the setting of infinite streaming data brings great complexity to budget allocation and arbitrage-freeness. As the market maker should protect every sequence of data points of each data owner occurring in w successive time points, the task of privacy budget allocation concerns not only the privacy losses at a single time point, but also on the timeline. If the market maker goes a further step to let each owner personalize the parameter w, the length of the sequence, the situation will become more complicated because the distribution pattern of all the data owners' privacy budgets will change over time. Such time-varying pattern raises great complexity of finding an arbitrage-free function, since the function should be fixed for the whole timeline and therefore a fixed distribution pattern of privacy budgets would be better.
Contributions
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
First, we designed a new trading framework where each owner is enabled to set her own privacy preferences, including the personalized bound of individual privacy loss and personalized slidingwindow size as parameters of Personalized W-event Privacy. We proposed several timeline budget allocation algorithms to appropriately allocate privacy budgets over the timeline, so that privacy losses are sold as much as possible for data owners within their bounds. The experimental results show that our Seize-the-moment algorithm significantly outperforms other baseline algorithms.
Second, in order to achieve better utility for data buyers under the constraint of arbitrage-freeness, we designed a point budget allocation algorithm called Grouping for the Sample mechanism [14] which achieves Personalized Differential Privacy [14] . We found that the combination of the Sample mechanism and Grouping behaves well when the number of data owners are relatively small and can always decrease the minimum affordable variance for query answers.
Third, we designed arbitrage-free trading mechanisms for streaming data consisting of three modules: TimelineBudgetAlloc, Point-BudgetAlloc, and PerturbMech. In order to easily design arbitragefree pricing functions, we proved a theorem presenting the sufficient conditions in which the utility function of some perturbation mechanism will result in an arbitrage-free pricing function. Then, we found that if the parameter of the Grouping algorithm satisfies some limitation, the Sample mechanism will meet such conditions in the theorem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic settings in our framework. Section 3 gives a whole view of our trading framework. Section 4 discusses the technical details in the modules of our framework. Section 5 presents the experimental results. Section 6 introduces the related work and finally Section 7 draws a conclusion.
PRELIMINARY
In this section, we introduce the basic settings in our framework including the notions concerning pricing queries, our privacy definition and problem formulation.
Pricing Queries
Before the discussion of our problems, we first clarify the definition of location data streams and the queries in our framework, and the notion of arbitrage-freeness.
Location data stream. A location data point is the basic element in a location database. The market maker collects location data points of data owners at intervals. All of data points are grouped into location databases D t by time point t, and each D t contains n data points. A location data stream is a set of infinite location databases and a stream prefix is composed of finite ones. We note that each owner contributes only one location data point at a single time point. A location data point is a triple p = (u, t, l) where u is a user's identity, t is the time point and l is the location, u, t, l ∈ Z + . We write p t i to denote the location data point of the data owner i at the time point t. A stream prefix is a sequence
.., p t n } is a set of location data points collected at the time point t.
Counting Query. For simplicity, we assume data buyers are interested only in counting query, i.e., histogram, which is a primitive of many complicated data analysis methods. A location database D t can be transformed into a counting vector c t = (c t 1 , ..., c t d ) T where the element c t l is the total number of data owners who was in the location l at the time point t and d is the number of locations. The answer of a counting query Q over the database D t is the vector c t .
Arbitrage-free Pricing Functions. Given the above query, we use the variance v to measure the utility of query answers. Thus, the price of a query answer depends only on the variance. Our definition of arbitrage-free is derived from the definition in [19] .
Privacy Definition
As we are going to trade personal data with bounded individual privacy loss and there is no fixed definition of privacy, we also should define the privacy metric in our framework. To preserve data owners privacy, the true query answer cannot be returned to the buyer and the market maker should perturb the answer by some perturbation mechanism achieving a formal privacy standard. We follow the setting of [19] to use differential privacy as a privacy metric. The idea of differential privacy, in brief, says that we should guarantee that the output will change very slightly if any data point in the database changes.
In ϵ-differential privacy, the value of privacy protection metric ϵ is uniform for all the data owners (or data points). However, the fact that data owners are allowed to set their maximum tolerable privacy losses in our framework requires personalized privacy protection level of each data point. Therefore, we employ the personalized differential privacy as our privacy protection standard. In personalized differential privacy [14] , a privacy loss ϵ i is a personalized privacy protection metric, and a privacy specification Φ is a mapping from data owners to their privacy losses. [14] ). Given a privacy specification Φ = {(u i , ϵ i )|u i ∈ U }, a perturbation mechanism M : D → R satisfies Φ-personalized differential privacy, if for any pair of neighboring databases D, D ′ ⊂ D, with D u i ∼ D ′ , and for any o ∈ O ⊆ R, we have:
However, Personalized Differential Privacy still just protects statistics derived from a static database and cannot be directly applicalbe to streaming data. As the w-event privacy [16] works well in streaming scenarios, we employs a personalized W-event privacy where W = {(u i , w i )|u i ∈ U } is a window specification mapping from data owners to their preferred sliding-window sizes w i . We write S τ = (D 1 , ..., D τ ) to denote a stream prefix. Two stream prefixes S τ , S τ ′ are w i -neighboring [16] if:
(1) there are at most w i pairs of such neighboring databases
, and (3) all the neighboring pairs are in a w i -length window.
a mechanism M that takes a stream prefix as input satisfies Φ-personalized W-event privacy, if for any pair of w i -neighborbing stream prefixes S τ , S τ ′ , with any pair of their
We proves our theorems in the appendix. Theorem 2.2 (The Laplace Mechanism [10] [14] ). Given a function f : D → R and a database D t , the Laplace mechanism that returns f
Theorem 2.3 (The Sample Mechanism [14] ). Given a function f : D → R, a database D t and a privacy specification
is a configurable threshold, and then executes the Laplace mechanism to return f
and SD t is the sampled database of D t . The Sample mechanism satisfies Φ t -personalized differential privacy.
Problem Formulation
There are three parties of participants in our marketplace: data owners, data buyers, and a market maker. Each party has its own interests and goals.
Data Buyers. A data buyer can request a query with a specific utility and get a perturbed query answerc t where t is a time point. We define our utility metric as the maximum variance ofc t , referred to as the required variance v, such that V ar [c t [i]] ≤ v for all i. We set the query price π (v) determined only by the required variance v. For the sake of data buyers, for the same v, we endeavor to lower the π (v). Also, for the same query price, the lower variance, the better. Data Owners. Data owners are the source of location data. Each data owner u i contributes her unique data point p t i at each time point t. Each data owner i should specify her maximum tolerable privacy lossε i for any her sequence of data points occurring in w i successive time points, referred to as privacy loss boundε i , and the sliding-window size w i . Let ϵ t i be the data owner i's privacy loss due to the query answerc t . We also define our utility function as v = U (·) which takes as input [ϵ t 1 , ..., ϵ t n ] and outputs the maximum variance v mentioned above. In order to achieve the personalized W-event privacy, for each data owner i, we should mare sure that:
Data owners make a contract with the market maker who compensates them according to a compensation function µ(·). Each owner's compensation µ(ϵ t i ) = cr · ϵ t i only depends on her privacy loss ϵ t i where cr > 0 is a global compensation rate. Thus, within their privacy loss bounds, they want their privacy losses to be consumed as much as possible, so that they can gain more money in return. Hence, the goal of the data owner i can be defined as:
The Market Maker: The maker acts as a trustworthy intermediary between data owners and data buyers. For each query occurring at t, the maker should ensure that the query price π t is not less than the sum of compensations µ t i :
The maker is also supposed to guarantee that the pricing function π (v) is arbitrage-free as defined in 4.1.
PERSONAL DATA TRADING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we give a whole view of our trading framework and introduce it from both the perspectives of trading at a singe time point and over the whole timeline. We summarize some important notations in Table 1 . Figure 3 illustrates our trading framework containing three phases: Offer, Quote, and Delivery. Once the maker updates the current time point τ , she executes the process of timeline budget allocation to allocate timeline privacy budgets. Then if the maker receives a query request, she allocates point privacy budgets and announces the minimum affordable variance checkv to the buyer. After the buyer chooses the required v ≥ checkv, the maker quotes the query price of this v. In case the maker receives the payment from the the compensation function,
Framework Overview
the utility function which outputs v buyer, she compensates data owners, calculates the privacy losses based on the v, and delivers a perturbed query answerc t to the buyer. For simplicity of our discussion, we assume that only one perturbed query answer can be requested at each time point.
At A Single Time Point
At the current time point τ , the procedure of streaming data trading includes the following phases.
Offer: In the phase of Offer, at the beginning, the buyer requests a query Q τ over the database D τ . Then, the market maker executes the process of point budget allocation. That is, given the list of timeline privacy budgets [ε τ 1 , ...,ε τ n ], the maker calculates point privacy budgetε τ i for each data owner u i by some point budget allocation algorithm. Finally, the maker uses a utility function U ([ε τ 1 , ...,ε τ n ]) to return the minimum affordable variancev of the query answer to the buyer. Quote: Given the minimum affordable variancev, the buyer should choose a variance v >v. Then, the market maker should calculate each owner's privacy loss ϵ τ i for this variance by the inverse function of the utility function. Then, the market maker uses the following function to price the query:
where r is the rate of profit for the market maker and cr is the rate of compensation. We note that there are many ways to design an arbitrage-free pricing function, even independent of the compensation function µ(ϵ i ). We consider a practical setting in which the market maker can charge portion of the cost (compensations) as her profit. Dilivery: In the phase of Delivery, the buyer pays the price π (v) to the market maker and receives a perturbed query answer with the required variance v in return. The answer is perturbed by a specific perturbation mechanism which achieves personalized W-event privacy.
Streaming Data Trading
From the perspective of trading data in a streaming timeline, we need another procedure to allocate timeline privacy budgets {ε 1 i , ...,ε τ i } for each data owner's data points {p 1 i , ..., p τ i } under the constraint of personalized W-event privacy as shown in Eq. 1. That is to say, at the time point t, for any data owner i, the sum of the privacy losses for the previous successive w − 1 data points and the to-beallocated budget should be no more than the privacy loss bound of owner i. Thus, we have the following timeline privacy constraint. Definition 3.1 (Timeline Privacy Constraint). For any current time point τ , for any data owner i, we should guarantee that:
Hence, as shown in Alg. 1, there are three key modules in our streaming data trading framework:
• TimelineBudgetAlloc,
• PointBudgetAlloc, and • PerturbMech.
Algorithm 1 Streaming Data Trading
Input: required variance v Output: perturbed query answerc τ 1:
..,ε τ n ]); 5: Calculatev using [ε τ 1 , ...,ε τ n ]; 6: if v <v then 7:
return Rejection; 8: else 9:
Calculate the privacy losses [ϵ τ 1 , ..., ϵ τ n ]; 10:
Calculate the compensations µ(ϵ τ i ) and the price π (v); 11:
Collect the buyer's payment and compensate the owners; 12:
We note that every data owner i can change her own privacy preferences including her privacy loss boundε i and preferred slidingwindow size w i , at any time. Once an owner changes such personalized parameters, it will come into effect at the next time point τ + 1 and for future, which means the level of privacy guarantee will be unchanged for the time points 1 to τ . For example, if u i dose not want to sell her data point at the next time point τ + 1, he can notify the maker and then the parameterε i will be equal to zero so that she will suffer no privacy loss. However, for simplicity of our discussion, we just considers the case where no data owner changes her privacy preferences. Also, since data owners might be confused how to set the value ofε i (or w i ), the maker could instruct them by giving some intuitive explanations (e.g., the combination ofε i = 10 and w i = 2 may result in a low level of privacy guarantee).
PROPOSED TRADING MECHANISMS
In the previous section, we have introduced the trading framework. In this section, we discuss the technical details in the modules of the framework.
Instantiating Modules
We instantiate the three key modules in our trading framework with different strategies. We design three strategies (Algorithm 2, 3, 4, 5) for TimelineBudgetAlloc in Subsection 4.1.1, two strategies (Algorithm 6, 7) for PointBudgetAlloc in Subsection 4.1.2.
4.1.1
TimelineBudgetAlloc. We note that our Alg. 2, 3, 5 guarantee that there is always privacy budget remained for the next time point for each data owner. As for Alg. 4, the privacy budget will be exhausted at most once for each owner. Strategy 1: Timeline Uniform (Alg. 2). For each data owner u i , Timeline Uniform just allocatesε i /w i to each data point of u i . In this way, the privacy budgets {ε 1 i , ...,ε τ i } for a single owner are uniform. However, because each privacy budgetε τ i might not be used up and it is always fixedly allocated, the remained privacy budgetε τ i − ϵ τ i never influences the next time of timeline budget allocation, which causes much of the maximum tolerable privacy lossε i might be wasted. For the sake of the party of data owners, this strategy leaves much to be desired.
Algorithm 2 Timeline Uniform (TimelineBudgetAlloc)
Strategy 2: Proportional Allocation (Alg. 3). For each data owner u i , Proportional Allocation forever allocates a fixed proportion pro of the total remained privacy budget 1 2 (ε i − τ −1 t =τ −w i +1 ϵ t i ) to u i 's data point. This strategy takes the remained privacy budget into consideration so that less ofε i is wasted; it also guarantees that there forever is privacy budget remained for future.
If pro = 1, it puts all emphasis on the current time point and provides the locally best result for the coming query. However, a locally best result not necessarily leads to a globally best result. If the buyer exhausts the owner u i 's timeline privacy budgetε τ i , at Algorithm 3 Proportional Allocation (TimelineBudgetAlloc)
the next time point τ + 1, there will be no privacy budget for u i and thus the variance of the query answer infinitely high. Strategy 3: Seize-the-moment (Alg. 4). Seize-the-moment means it always allocates as much privacy budget as possible at the moment. At the first time point 1, it is a special case of Proportional Allocation where the fixed proportion pro S is 1. At the time point τ , for the owner u i , once the buyer exhausts her timeline privacy budgetε τ i , Seize-the-moment decreases the fixed proportion pro i for her. If buyers use up u i 's timeline privacy budgets all the time, the pro S for u i will be 0.5. . Thus, the privacy budget for p τ i might be equal tô 
Algorithm 4 Seize-the-moment (TimelineBudgetAlloc)
Hence Budget Absorption chooses 4 as the privacy budget.
PointBudgetAlloc.
Strategy 1: User Uniform (Alg. 6). Since the privacy budgetŝ ϵ τ i might be different, we should further allocate privacy budgets, because some perturbation mechanism, such as the Laplace mechanism, requires the uniform privacy losses for data owners. User Uniform finds the minimum privacy budget min{ε τ i }, and then allocates it to all the data points. Thus, the point privacy budgets ϵ τ i = min{ε τ i } are uniform. Strategy 2: Grouping (Alg. 7). As User Uniform just outputs uniform point privacy budgets, timeline privacy budgets might be too far from full use. In order to sell more privacy losses and increase the minimum affordable variance of the query answer, we have to enable part of data owners to suffer more privacy loss than the minimum privacy budget. Thus, Grouping sorts the owners by their timeline privacy budgetsε τ i and divides them into two groups by a configurable proportion α ∈ (0, 1): α of owners with poor privacy budgets ϵ poor , and 1 − α with rich privacy budgets ϵ r ich . We write ϵ thr eshold to denote the minimum timeline privacy budget in the rich group. Then, it allocates: to the poor group as their point privacy budgets, and
to the rich group, in which the k > 1 is a configurable parameter. We note that min iε τ i is the minimum timeline privacy budget among all the data owners, rather than among those in one of the two groups. Example 4.3. Consider the example as shown in Figure 6 . We group the owners by α = 0.5, and the k is equal to 6. Thus, the minimum timeline budget min iε τ 1 is the owner u 1 'sε τ 1 , and the minimum timeline budget in the rich group is the owner u 3 'sε τ 3 . Becauseε τ 3 < 6 ·ε τ 1 , Grouping allocatesε τ 3 /6 = 3/6 = 0.5 to each member in the poor group, andε τ 3 = 3 to each in the rich. 
Integrating Modules
Because TimelineBudgetAlloc can be freely combined with the other two modules, PointBudgetAlloc and PertubMech, we just discuss the integration of the latter two modules in this subsection.
Utility Sub-function. As mentioned above, the distribution pattern of all the data owners' privacy budgets will change over time.
Such time-varying pattern raises great complexity of finding an arbitrage-free function, because the function should be fixed for the whole timeline and a fixed distribution pattern of privacy budgets (or privacy losses) would be better. Hence, we attempts to fix the distribution pattern such that we can create a mapping between a single user's privacy loss ϵ t i and the variance v. LetÚ (·) be the utility sub-function which takes as input a single ϵ t i and outputs v. Because for the same query answer, data owners' privacy losses might be different while there is only one maximum variance v, which means the utility sub-function for each ϵ t i might also be different. For owners whose privacy losses are the same and equal to ϵ j , they are mapped into the same utility sub-functionÚ j (·).
Laplace-base Mechanism: TimelineBudgetAlloc + User Uniform + Laplace. User Uniform fits the Laplace mechanism because the owners receive uniform privacy losses by the Laplace mechanism. By the combination of User Uniform and the Laplace mechanism, at each time point t, the utility sub-function for each owner is uniform:
Sample-base Mechanism: TimelineBudgetAlloc + Grouping + Sample. The utility function of the Sample mechanism is complex and even different for each time point because the distribution pattern of privacy losses is time-varying. Hence, we have to make efforts to fix the utility function. Grouping ensures that at each time point t, there are only two kinds of privacy losses, ϵ poor and ϵ r ich with ϵ poor = ϵ r ich k , which makes the distribution pattern of privacy losses uniform over time. That means there are n · α owners falling into the poor group, and n · (1 − α) into the rich. By the combination of Grouping and the Sample mechanism, we have the utility sub-function:
where n is the number of data owners and α is the rate of Grouping.
Arbitrage-freeness Guarantees. As shown above, we bind the Laplace and Sample mechanisms with Uniform and Grouping, respectively; also, the utility function depends on the combination of the algorithm and mechanism. That is because, we found that, given a perturbation mechanism, the point budget allocation algorithm must guarantee that the utility function has some certain properties so that the pricing function is arbitrage-free, as shown in the Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. Given a perturbation mechanism, if each utility sub-function v =Ú j (ϵ j ) satisfies the following conditions:
≤ 0 then the pricing function π (v) = (1+r ) ·cr · j n j ·ϵ j is arbitrage-free, where n j is the constant number of owners whose utility sub-function isÚ j (ϵ j ).
For the Laplace-base mechanism, obviously, the utility sub-function is decreasing, lim ϵ t i →0 +Ú (ϵ t i ) = +∞, andÚ (ϵ t i ) ·Ú ′′ (ϵ t i ) − 2 · [Ú ′ (ϵ t i )] 2 ≤ 0. Hence, according to Theorem 4.1, the pricing function π Lap (v) = (1 + r ) · cr · n · ∆f √ v/2 is arbitrage-free.
For the Sample-base mechanism, the pricing function is derived as:
Unfortunately, π Sam (v) is not always arbitrage-free: we found that the parameter k in the utility sub-functions affects the arbitragefreeness of π Sam (v) as shown in Proposition 4.2. , the pricing function π Sam (v)
is arbitrage-free.
, both the utility sub-functions satisfyÚ , then we will derive an arbitrage-free pricing function for the Sample-base mechanism.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct several sets of experiments to testify which timeline budget allocation strategy performs better in terms of selling more privacy losses for data owners, and on the other hand, which perturbation mechanism (with corresponding point budget allocation strategies) in terms of achieving better utility for data buyers.
Settings. Because of the lack of real-world datasets which fit in with the needs of our settings, we generate datasets by programming including a stream prefix of location databases, a dataset of data owners with their privacy loss bounds, and a dataset of queries. In this paper, because we do not consider any data correlation (which will be considered in our future work), the locations in our location databases are randomly picked for simplicity. The parameters of each dataset is summarized as shown in Table 2 . Each data owner u i randomly belongs to a group with regard toε i /w i , her average maximum tolerable privacy loss to each data point which is also generated randomly. We note that the size of each database is equal to the number of users n. 
Effect on Selling Privacy Losses
Request the same variance v. Figure 8 illustrates the effect of different combinations of allocation strategies and perturbation mechanisms. Data buyers the same required variance for all the time points, and outputs the average privacy loss among all the data points. As we can see, for the Laplace-base mechanism, Seizethe-moment outperforms the others, which means it can help sell more privacy losses. For the Sample-base mechanism (combined with Grouping), Seize-the-moment also works best for low variance. However, with the required variance increasing, the gap between each strategy's performance narrows and disappears finally. Hence, if buyers always want accurate queries, the superiority of Seizethe-moment will be highlighted. Unsurprisingly, Timeline Uniform performs the worst where even no privacy loss is sold when the required variance is low.
Varying the standard sliding-window size w. Then we want to know the impact of window size. This time for each query the buyer randomly choose a required variance v more than the minimum affordable variancev. As shown in Figure 9 , it seems that the slidingwindow size has slight impact on the average privacy loss. That is mainly because the average bound per windowε i /w i for each u i is fixed and Time Uniform forever allocates it to each data point.
On the contrast, Seize-the-moment still performs the best for all the set of sliding-window sizes and for both the Laplace-base and Sample-base mechanisms. Proportional Allocation behaves better and better with the w increasing, from the worst to even the second best, probably because it can allocates more privacy budget to a single data point when the sliding-window size is higher.
Effect on Achieving Higher Utility
Impact of the number of users n. As we can see in Figure 9 , the Sample-base mechanism is more sensitive to the number of users n. When n = 100, for the same required variance, the maker quotes higher prices if perturbs the query by the Laplace-base mechanism. When n = 400, however, the situation reverses where the Samplebase mechanism results in more payments. Recall the utility subfunctions of the two mechanisms. We can find that only the utility sub-functions of the Sample-base mechanism involve the n while the Laplace-base mechanism's is independent of it. Hence, with the increase of the n, the average price per owner or the compensation to each owner stays the same in the Laplace-base mechanism but linearly rises in the Sample-base mechanism. In addition, whichever the n is, some extremely low values of the required variance cannot be requested in the Laplace-base mechanism, which means the Sample-base mechanism can supply choices of more accurate query answers. Actual utility. Since the required variance v is the variance in the worst case which satisfies V ar [c t [i]] ≤ v for all i, the next step is to measure the actual utility of the query answers. As shown in Figure  11 , in the Laplace-base mechanism, there is almost no difference between the required variance and the actual variance; but in the Sample-base mechanism, the actual variance is obviously lower than the required one, which means that the buyer may obtain a more accurate query answer than she expects. In addition, for the Laplace-base mechanism, MSE must be equal to the required variance, since it causes no bias, and the experimental results also 8: Effect of timeline budget allocation strategies Figure 9 : Impact of sliding-window size on average privacy loss Figure 9 : Impact of the number of users Figure 11 : Impact of perturbation mechanisms on utility Figure 12 : Impact of an exceptional owner confirm it. On the other hand, the Sample-base mechanism sometimes brings bias but the results seemingly show that the MSE is also lower than the required variance as it is the variance in the worst case. Impact of an exceptional owner. Although we randomly generate three groups of users with privacy loss bounds which are randomly chosen , further we want to experiment on the special cases where an exceptional owner with an extremely low bound join in. We vary such extremely low bound below the floor of the range ofε i /w i of the conservative group, which is equal to 0.5. As shown in Figure 12 , the Laplace-base mechanism is highly sensitive to the lowest bound while it seems to have so slight influence on the Sample-base mechanism that the latter can cope better in cases where there is an extremely conservative data owner.
RELATED WORK
Personal Data Trading. Balazinska et al. [2] guides the tendency of research on Data Market for the database research community. In recent years, personal data or individual privacy loss has been perceived as a commodity. Ghosh et al. [13] designed markets for trading statistics over private data and the privacy loss at auctions. Then, Riederer et al. [22] focused on allowing users to decide which part of their personally identifiable information for sale in the auction. Koutris et al. [18] proposed the original model of querybased pricing which no negotiation is allowed in terms of pricing. Li et al. [19] adapted the query-based model with the constraint of arbitrage-free and privacy preservation by differential privacy. Nget et al. [20] analyzed people's privacy attitude and thus attempted to limit the bound of privacy loss for data owners. Niu et al. [21] proposed a pricing framework trading common aggregate statistics over correlated data. As for location data, a data-sharing mechanism and decision framework was proposed by Aly et al. to estimate the expected value of a single data point and make purchasing decisions [1] ; Kanza et al. [15] also presented a geosocial marketplace taking privacy protection into account.
Differentially Private Streaming Data Release. The research on differentially private streaming data was initiated by the work of Dwork et al. [9] : event-level DP which protects at most one single event, and user-level DP which hides all the events of each user. Their another work [11] focused on finite data streams and a binary tree is constructed to inject an appropriate noise. Then, Chan et al. [8] adapted such technique for infinite streams. Bolot et al. [3] proposed the notion of decayed privacy to reduce the privacy protection level of previous data. Recently, Kellaris et al. [16] tackled the limitations of event-level DP and user-level DP, and introduced the notion of w-event privacy where a sliding window methodology is applied. They also proposed budget allocation algorithms budget distribution (BD) and budget absorption (BA) which allocate portion of the entire privacy budget for approximation of data publishing and portion for data perturbation. Wang et al. [23] [24] further proposed an adaptive budget allocation algorithm which dynamically computes the portion to increase the utility of the released data. Then, in order to personalize the fixed parameter w of window size, and the rate of data points being generated, Cao et al. [5] extended w-event privacy to l-trajectory privacy. Also, they investigated data correlations in streaming data which causes temporal privacy loss, and proposed mechanisms to bound such privacy loss [6] [7].
CONCLUSION
We have proposed a trading framework for location data streams where each data owner's privacy loss under personalized w-event differential privacy is bounded for the sake of data owners. The formalized problems to be solved in our framework can be further modularized as TimelineBudgetAlloc, PointBudgetAlloc, and Perturb-Mech. Thus, we designed several instances for each module and combined them as two kinds of arbitrage-free trading mechanisms. Finally, we conducted several sets of experiments with synthesis datasets to evaluate the performance of each mechanism in making full use of privacy budgets and achieving better utility. The results show that the Sample-base mechanism with Grouping improves the utility when the number of data owners is small, and Seize-the-moment can sell more privacy losses.
A PROOFS
Theorem A.1. Let M 1 , ..., M τ be a set of mechanisms where each independent perturbation mechanism M t satisfies Φ t -personalize differential privacy and M t (D t ) = o t . Let M be a mechanism which takes a stream prefix S τ = (D 1 , ..., D τ ) as input and outputs (M 1 (D 1 ), ..., M τ (D τ )). Then, M satisfies Φ-personalized W-event privacy if for any t ∈ [τ ] and any u i , we have
Proof. For any pair of w i -neighboring stream prefixes S τ , S τ ′ with any pair of their neighboring D t u i ∼ D t ′ , any τ and any output o = (o 1 , ..., o τ ) ∈ O ⊆ O, Due to Definition 2.4, we have:
Because each M t is independent, we have:
. Then, we have:
Thus, M satisfies Φ-personalized W-event privacy. □ Theorem A.2. Given a perturbation mechanism, if each utility sub-function v =Ú j (ϵ j ) satisfies the following conditions:
(1) decreasing, which meansÚ ′ j (ϵ j ) < 0, (2) lim ϵ j →0 +Ú j (ϵ j ) = +∞, (3)Ú j (ϵ j ) ·Ú ′′ j (ϵ j ) − 2 · [Ú ′ j (ϵ j )] 2 ≤ 0 then the pricing function π (v) = (1+r ) · j n j ·cr ·ϵ j is arbitrage-free, where n j is the constant number of owners whose utility sub-function isÚ j (ϵ j ). Then, for any multiset v 1 , ..., v m and any a 1 , ..., a m such that m k =1 a k = 1 and m k=1 a 2 k v k ≤ v, according to Lemma A.3, we have:
Then, we have:
(1 + r ) · j n j · cr ·Ú −1 i (v k ) = Proof. Because U (ϵ) is decreasing, U (ϵ) has its inverse function and U −1 (v) is decreasing, which means U −1 ′ (v) < 0. Then, we have: 
